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Abstract—  This paper develops a double-sided moral 
hazard model of share contract in agriculture, with imperfect 
quality measurement by the agent and the principal, who 
contribute to the final good quality in terms of production 
effort and marketing effort respectively. Using this model, we 
analyse the implications of the share contract for quantity and 
quality, often ignored in previous analysis. With the help of a 
simulation exercise, we prove that the outcome-conditioned 
share generally weakens the agent´s incentive to make effort in 
quality input. This finding could explain the contractual 
evidence in some differentiated markets such as the wine 
market, where bottle-price conditioned contracts are rarely 
used.     
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The agri-food system is undergoing a fundamental 
transformation that is altering traditional marketing 
relationships to better serve customer needs. These changes 
are drawing customers, processors and growers into 
increasing coordination relationships, improving the flow of 
information up the supply chain and enabling firms to better 
meet customer needs.   
The question of quality is becoming a central point in the 
agricultural sector. Indeed, the competitiveness of food 
companies in national and international markets depends 
upon their ability to adopt production processes which meet 
quality requirements.  
It is well known that the best way for a processor to 
prevent quality failures is to make sure that he acquires 
high-quality inputs. But is also undeniable that moral hazard 
problems arise when the higher quality products are more 
expensive to produce than low quality products and the 
buyer cannot directly observe quality properties. In this 
situation, there can be a lack of effort on the part of the 
supplier. That is, a supplier promises to exert effort to 
enhance quality but does not do so. Because quality 
measurement is subject to diagnostic and sampling error, a 
buyer cannot be sure that a supplier has fulfilled its promise 
to deliver quality food inputs. 
What contract drives growers to act in the interest of 
processors? The principal-agent model is without question a 
dominant theoretical framework in the study of incentives 
and contracts. In order to provide an incentive for the agent 
to make an appropriate effort level, much of the literature on 
principal-agent relationships has proposed a share contract 
based upon verifiable measures of performance as the 
optimal scheme compensation under moral hazard [1, 2]. 
Despite the importance of this outcome-based 
performance contract for some agricultural commodities 
such as fresh fruit and vegetables [3], for others the use of 
this type of contract is rarely observed. A convincing 
evidence of this statement is present in viticulture, where 
share contracts are rarely used. Thus a central question, and 
one which will be the focus of this paper, is to explain why 
share contracts are used in certain situations but not in 
others.     
To answer this question it is worth reminding that a 
common assumption adopted in the standard moral-hazard 
literature is that the principal is passive as far as production 
is concerned. In many principal-agent relationships, 
however, the principal do have some choice variables (e.g., 
local advertising, sales effort and similar variables) that 
substantially affect the product’s performance and hence, 
the price that consumers are willing to pay. Then there is a 
double moral hazard problem that surprisingly many 
previous studies have ignored. Exceptions include [4] y [5].    
To fill this gap, we study the characteristics of share 
contracts for a given principal-agent relationship. We 
consider a risk-averse agent who not only he makes an 
effort in input quantity, but also in input quality. On the 
other hand, a neutral-averse principal takes actions that also 
affect the output quality. Given that their efforts are 
unobservable by both parties, there is a double moral-hazard 
situation in which both parties participate in the final quality 
perceived by the demand. While the case of the both parties 
being subject to moral hazard due to supplying 
unobservable efforts have been considered in the literature, 
we believe that our specification is new in the literature and 
more realistic since agents often supply both efforts in 
quantity and quality. However, the traditional double moral 
hazard models only include an effort by the agent.  
Using this generalized double moral-hazard model, we 
formally prove that when the processor contributes to the 
final quality in terms of processing and marketing efforts, 
the outcome-conditioned share contract generally weakens 
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the grower´s incentive to make his effort in quality. This 
result helps resolve the anomaly mentioned earlier.    
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. 
The following section sets up the model of double moral 
hazard using this generalized framework. We then carry out 
a simulation exercise to understand the choice of share 
contract under a wide variety of circumstances and show the 
main results. A final section presents a discussion of the 
implications of the study and suggestions for future 
research.  
II. THE MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS  
We develop here a generalized double-sided moral 
hazard model for analyzing a general linear contract for 
sharing an outcome between a grower and a processor. The 
quality output depends on the effort levels of both the 
grower and processor who are both subject to moral hazard.  
To illustrate the proposed methodology, the following 
case is analysed where both parties maximize a constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function and the 
stochastic variables are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Following [6] the problem can be handled as an E-V 
problem.  The detailed assumptions of the model are as 
follows:  
The primary producer: The grower, risk-averse, 
contributes to the input quantity, q , and input quality,s , in 
terms of production efforts in both variables,   and   
respectively, according to: 
q s
q q =  and  s s s μ =  where 
s μ
∼ s N σ , 1 (
). Randomness of quality is imputable to its 
imprecise definition and imprecise measurement. 
The processor: The processor, risk-neutral, transforms 
the raw material (input) into finished product (output). We 
assume that there are not losses of quantity in the 
transformation process. That is, the quantity output,Q , will 
be defined as  ( ) q q q f Q = = = λ   where  1 = λ . 
Likewise, we further consider that there are no raw material 
processing costs. Although these unrealistic assumptions are 
made for the purpose of analytical simplification, they do 
not take away from the applicability and implications of the 
model.  
This paper assumes that a grower contributes to the final 
quality output,S , in terms of his effort in input quality, s, 
and the processor in terms of processing and marketing 
efforts1,  , according to  b s b S + =θ , with  0 ≥ θ . The 
efficiency factor θ  captures the relevance of the 
processor´s effort in the final quality perceived by the final 
customer. Since efforts are mutually imperfectly observed 
and their implication on final output can only imperfectly 
measured, there is scope for opportunism on both sides.  
The price function: the demand function for the processor 
output is assumed to be linear in its own price, P , and 
quality, S :  
( ) P S P S f Q 2 1 , λ λ − = =   with  λ1>0 , λ2>0        [1] 
From (1), the inverse demand function facing the 
processor i is given by: 
  ( ) Q b S a Q S f P 1 , − = =  with 
       2 1 λ λ = a ,  2 1 λ = b                         [2] 
The cost function: There is a cost associated with each 
effort because it is unpleasant and forgoes the opportunity 
to undertake other activities. Input production costs, c, are a 
function of the efforts in quantity and quality. As is 
traditionally the case in models of this kind, we assume 
marginal production costs regardless of quantity effort 
volume and quadratically in line with the given level of 






     with                        [3]  0 1 > c
And similar to the models of franchise, we assume that 
the private cost of effort for the processor is the same as for 






     with                        [4]  0 1 > c
 
The double moral hazard model 
 
According to principal-agent theory, when the risk-
averse agent faces a trade-off between the provision of 
incentives and risk sharing, an outcome-conditioned sharing 
contract can be a second-best pay scheme [8, 9]. This 
implies a two-part compensation scheme, , consisting of 
(i) a fixed payment, 
w
α , that is independent of the observed 
outcome, and (ii) an incentive payment that amounts to a 
positive share, β , of the publicly observable outcome: 
                                                           
1. 
1 Given the processor is risk-neutral, we omit the presence of 
uncertainty in his effort because it does not affect the final 
results of the model.  
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  P x w β α+ =                         [5] 
We consider revenue like performance indicator because 
it has been demonstrated [10] that when the principal has a 
greater potential to impact on retail demand due to branding 
revenue sharing contracts are better to provide appropriate 
incentives than profit sharing contracts.  
When the principal also provides efforts which affect the 
outcome, the incentive provision for both the agent´s action 
and the principal´s own effort level must be taken into 
account when designing the agent´s incentive scheme. In 
this way, the processor chooses the parameters of the 
incentive scheme, α  and β , to maximize her expected 
profit subject to the constraints that both, processor and 
grower, choose individually their efforts to maximize their 
certainty equivalent and that the grower attains at least his 
reservation utility,  i U , i.e.,  
() ] 6 [ 1
Pr
, α β
β α − − − = C QP CE Max
ocessor     
    










β α − − + =
      [7] 





U c QP QP ≥ − − + β σ
ρ
β α
        [8] 
(Grower´s reservation constraint) 




                [9] 
(Processor´s incentive compatibility constraint) 
 
We solve the optimization problem in equations (6-9) 
sequentially. First, we determine the effort choice made by 
the processor:  






c Q b s b a Q CE Max
ocessor
b    [10] 
 The optimal solution to the processor´s decision on 
effort in equation [10] is 
() 0 1 1
Pr

















    [11] 
Second, given the processor´s choice, we determine the 
efforts in quantity and quality that maximize grower´s 
certainty equivalent:  
() ()



















− + + =
            [12] 
First-order necessary conditions for maximizing [12] 



















σ ρβ θ β     [13] 
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σ ρβ β             [14] 
The reaction functions derived from the above 









s s a b
s






=                        [15] 
2 2 2






=                                   [16] 
Substituting the previous expressions,  ( ) β f q =  and 
( ) β f s = , into equations [6] and [8] and choosing α and 
β, Kuhn-Tucker conditions reveal a boundary solution with 








U c QP QP + + + − = β σ
ρ
β α                     [17] 
Finally, substituting [17],  () β f b = ,  ( ) β f q =  and 
( ) β f s =  into [6] and maximizing with respect to β, it 
may be obtained the value of  β optimal.  
III. SIMULATION 
The principal-agent model of [1] has been widely used to 
analyze various issues in economics. However, it usually 
remains impossible to explicitly solve the first-order 
conditions that define the decision variables´ values in the 
12
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share contract. Quantitative applications of the principal-
agent model therefore require numerical solutions.   
Similarly, figure 1b shows as the grower´s effort in 
quantity varies as the importance of the principal´s effort 
increases. In this same interval of θ, [0-0.9], the quantity 
input curve seems a smooth, gradual and a bit concave, with 
a minimum at θ=0.5.  
In this section, we carry out a simulation exercise with a 
wide range of scenarios, and selected the examples below as 
being representative of the behaviour we found. We solve 
Mathematica
2 to solve the model, and use Matlab to draw 
the planes using the data produced by Mathematica. We 
initially choose the following parameters:  1 = a , 
 and  . It should be noted that these 
initial values are used for convenience and has no special 
significance here and that simulation results do not change 
substantially if different values for a, b1 and c1 are used. 
00001 . 0 1 = b 1 1 = c
Figures 1c and 1d involve the quality efforts of both the 
agent and the principal, respectively. The shapes of these 
efforts as a function of the efficiency factor, θ, are 
considered here. Strikingly, when processor’s effort is more 
important in quality, the grower makes less effort. 
Conversely, the processor’s effort in quality is increasing in 
θ, as it can be deduced from equation [10].   
In order to capture the effect of principal´s effort on 
quality, a key aspect in this paper, we amend the 
effort/quality relationship to include not only the grower´s 
effort (agent´s), but also processor´s effort (principal´s), 
s b S + =θ , where the parameter θ>0 is a proxy for the 
importance of the principal´s effort.    
Then, we have three free parameters in our model: the 
processor´s efficiency factor, θ, the grower’s coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion,ρ , and the variance of input 
quality, . These latter two parameters can be jointly 
identified, , as both act on the producer’s risk premium 





To illustrate the analysis it may be worthwhile to 
consider a first scenario in which the agent is risk-neutral. 
We then repeat the analysis in an environment with a risk-
averse agent.    
 
a) First scenario: risk-neutral agent and principal 
As a benchmark for comparison, we first compute the 
solution to the agency problem assuming risk neutral 
agents. For the purposes of the simulation, we consider a 
fairly wide range of 0 to 0.9, in steps of 0.1, for the 
efficiency factor θ.  
In figure 1a we consider how the share of the outcome, β, 
varies as a function of the importance of the principal´s 
effort, θ. Consistent with the agency theory, the value of β is 
maximum at θ=0 when the processor has no interest in the 
quality and its value is 1, which implies that the agent 
receives all revenue. Likewise, as franchise contracting 
models predict, the share of the outcome β is decreasing in 
θ. This result was supported by other studies, for example 
[11], [12]. All of these papers obtain that when franchisor 
inputs are more important, less vertical separation is 
observed, as predicted.  
                                                           
2 The Mathematica commands are available from the authors on 
request. 
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Figure 1. Double moral-hazard with risk-neutral agent 
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b) Second scenario: risk-averse agent and risk-neutral 
principal 
  In this second scenario parameter estimates were 
obtained searching over an equally spaced grid of 100 
values for each parameter ranging from [0, 0.9] for θ and 
[0, 0.00009] for  .   
2
s ρσ
Figure 2a shows that as the producer´s risk premium 
(i.e. risk aversion or quality variance)  increases, 
given the value of the θ, the share of the outcome, β, 
decreases. This result supports the prediction made by the 
principal-agent framework with risk-averse agents (for 
[13]). In general, an increase in the importance of 
principal´s effort, given the value of the agent’s risk 
premium, will decrease the incidence of β. However, this 
result is not robust when the efficiency factor converges 
to zero, in which case the value of β increases. 
2
s ρσ
Analogously, figure 2b represents the behaviour of the 
input quantity as a function of the efficiency factor, θ, and 
risk premium, . When θ converges to zero, an 
increase in    will decrease the grower´s effort in 
quantity. However, when θ increases diverging from zero, 
the input quantity increases and moreover the negative 
incidence of an increase in   on input quantity goes 







Figures 2c and 2d involve the quality efforts of both 
the agent and the principal, respectively. The planes of 
these efforts as functions of the efficiency factor, θ, and 
risk premium, , are considered here. By observing 
both graphs, it is easy to deduce that in most cases both 
efforts vary in opposite sense. That is, when the 
efficiency factor and/or the risk premium increase, 
processor’s effort increases; on the contrary, primary 
producer’s effort in quality decreases. An exception to 
this result appears when θ converges to zero, in which 





The simulation exercise throws some light on the 
relative importance of including in the model that the 
12
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agent makes both efforts in quantity and quality, often 
ignored in previous analysis.  As the simulation exercise 
has demonstrated, when the importance of the principal´s 
effort increases (the only exception is when θ converges 
to zero), the share contract disincentives the agent to 
make an effort in quality in favour of effort in quantity.  
The results of this simulation exercise could explain 
why other contracts different from share contracts are 
used in sectors in which the quality is a key competitive 
variable. In many products highly differentiated, it is well 
known that the “lemon problem” exists in their markets. 
That is, consumers don’t know automatically the quality 
of the product, or the accuracy of the information 
supplied about the product’s characteristics. 
Consequently, this observed asymmetric information 
between processors and consumers can impair the 
functioning of the product market [14]. The solution 
carried in many industries has been to create quality 
signals by the processors.  An illustrative example is the 
wine market, in which consumers rarely are able to 
distinguish wine´s characteristics. Likewise, it is difficult 
to assess objectively the grape quality [15]. Then, 
wineries have made an important effort in creating quality 
signals such as the wine brand [16], exhibition awards 
[17], expert wine tastes [18,19] and winery visitation 
[20].  Consistent with our model, it could explain why 
bottle-price conditioned contracts are infrequently (if 
ever) applied in the contracting relationship between a 
grape grower and a winery over the supply of fresh 
grapes for wine production. 
 
Figure 2. Double-moral hazard model with risk-averse agent 
 
          Fig.2a. The share of the outcome (β)                         Fig.2b. Quantity input (q)  
   











         Fig.2c. Expected input quality (s)             Fig.2d. Processor´s effort  (b) 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
There is no doubt that firms have increasingly to deal 
with competitive markets in which quality has become a 
decisive aspect for competitiveness.   
To establish quality in final products it is important to 
consider the quality of raw materials, produce and 
structure of the value chain. However, the market for 
input quality is characterized by imperfect information, 
which generates moral hazard problems.  
This paper combines agency theory with evidence 
from actual contracts. Although most standard moral 
hazard models present the conclusion that only share 
contracts can be optimal in this scenario of imperfect 
information, the supporting evidence in some sectors has 
been weak. From this perspective, the primary role of this 
paper is to understand and rationalize this practice.  
Based on the study on agency theory and an 
examination of the relationship between growers and 
processors, we have developed a double-moral hazard 
model to examine the implications in terms of quality 
derived from outcome-conditioned share contracts. 
Although this paper is related closely to the classic paper 
of [13], there is an important aspect that differentiates the 
model from previous analysis of moral hazard. This paper 
considers jointly incentives, risk premium, double moral-
hazard, quantity and quality in a single model.  
We show that under the traditional moral hazard 
models the consideration of quantity and quality 
separately may lead to incorrect conclusions. That is, 
traditional agency models predict that agents respond to 
incentive contracts by improving their effort in quality 
[21].  However, with the help of a simulation exercise is 
has been demonstrated that when the processor takes 
actions that affects the product´s quality perceived by the 
customer, this contract weakens the primary producer´s 
incentive to make his effort in quality.    
It is interesting to note that, although the outcome-
conditioned share contract is not explicitly found in 
practice for some markets, we implicitly observe it in 
modes of governance in which the primary producers 
have property rights. In particular, the compensation 
scheme underlying in the mode of governance of 
producers organized through co-operatives corresponds to 
the outcome-conditioned incentive contract. Since the co-
operative allows risk-averse producers to participate in 
decision-making regarding commercial activity, the 
problem associated with the informative asymmetries 
diminishes. Consequently, the impact of the double moral 
hazard problem also diminishes. Despite this advantage, 
the cooperative faces important problems such as the 
free-riding. 
One limitation of this analysis is that it is not a 
dynamic analysis. It does not consider the possibility of a 
relationship between principal and agent over the time, 
and hence, it does not take into account reputation effects 
of insincere behavior. However, in practice, processors 
tend to contract repeatedly with the producers whom they 
rely on. This limitation will be considered in future 
research efforts.  
However, because the contract that we examine have 
features common to other two-party contracts, our 
findings have implications beyond share-contract and 
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